Monday, July 12, 2004

Session 4: Justin

Philadelphia International Airport
July 12, 2004 3:44PM

Please read the following:

Pilosopiyang Medioebal
Dibisyon ng Pilosopiya
Bong S. Eliab
Ateneo de Davao University
DIALOGUE OF JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, WITH TRYPHO, A JEW.

CHAP. I -- INTRODUCTION.
While I was going about one morning in the walks of the Xystus, a certain man, with others in his company, having met me, said, "Hails O philosopher!" And immediately after saying this, he turned round and walked along with me; his friends likewise followed him. And I in turn having addressed him, said, "What is there important?"
And he replied, "I was instructed," says he, "by Corinthus the Socratic in Argos, that I ought not to despise or treat with indifference those who array themselves in this dress, but to show them all kindness, and to associate with them, as perhaps some advantage would Spring from the intercourse either to some such man or to myself. It is good, moreover for both, if either the one or the other be benefited. On this account, therefore, whenever I see any one in such costume, I gladly approach him, and now, for the same reason, have I willingly accosted you; and these accompany me, in the expectation of hearing for themselves something profitable from you."
" But who are you, most excellent man?" So I replied to him in jest.
Then he told me frankly both his name and his family. "Trypho," says he, "I am called; and I am a Hebrew of the circumcision, and having escaped from the war lately carried on there, I am spending my days in Greece, and chiefly at Corinth."
"And in what," said I, "would you be profited by philosophy so much as by your own lawgiver and the prophets?"
"Why not?" he replied. " Do not the philosophers turn every discourse on God? And do not questions continually arise to them about His unity and providence? Is not this truly the duty of philosophy, to investigate the Deity?"
" Assuredly ' said I, " so we too have believed. But the most have not taken thought of this, whether there be one or more gods, and whether they have a regard for each one of us or no, as if this knowledge contributed nothing to our happiness; nay, they moreover attempt to persuade us that God takes care of the universe with its genera and species, but not of me and you, and each individually, since otherwise we would surely not need to pray to Him night and day. But it is not difficult to understand the upshot of this; for fearlessness and license in speaking result to such as maintain these opinions, doing and saying whatever they choose, neither dreading punishment nor hoping for any benefit from God. For how could they? They affirm that the same things shall always happen; and, further, that you and I shall again live in like manner, having become neither better men nor worse. But there are some others, who, having supposed the soul to be immortal and immaterial, believe that though they have committed evil they will not suffer punishment (for that which is immaterial is insensible), and that the soul, in consequence of its immortality, needs nothing from God."
And he, smiling gently, said, "Tell us your opinion of these matters, and what idea you entertain respecting God, and what your philosophy is."
CHAP. II.--JUSTIN DESCRIBES HIS STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY.
"I will tell you," said I, "what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honorable before God,(1) to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics,(2) nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one.(3) I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first handled it [i.e., philosophy], and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine. Being at first desirous of personally conversing with one of these men, I surrendered myself to a certain Stoic; and having spent a considerable time with him, when I had not acquired any further knowledge of God (for he did not know himself, and said such instruction was unnecessary), I left him and betook myself to another, who was called a Peripatetic, and as he fancied, shrewd. And this man, after having entertained me for the first few days, requested me to settle the fee, in order that our intercourse might not be unprofitable. Him, too, for this reason I abandoned, believing him to be no philosopher at all. But when my soul was eagerly desirous to hear the peculiar and choice philosophy, I came to a Pythagorean, very celebrated--a man who thought much of his own wisdom. And then, when I had an interview with him, willing to become his hearer and disciple, he said, 'what then? Are you acquainted with music, astronomy, and geometry? Do you expect to perceive any of those things which conduce to a happy life, if you have not been first informed on those points which wean the soul from sensible objects, and render it fitted for objects which appertain to the mind, so that it can contemplate that which is honorable in its essence and that which is good in its essence?' Having commended many of these branches of learning, and telling me that they were necessary, he dismissed me when I confessed to him my ignorance. Accordingly I took it rather impatiently, as was to be expected when I failed in my hope, the more so because I deemed the man had some knowledge; but reflecting again on the space of time during which I would have to linger over those branches of learning, I was not able to endure longer procrastination. In my helpless condition it occurred to me to have a meeting with the Platonists, for their fame was great. I thereupon spent as much of my time as possible with one who had lately settled in our city,(4)--a sagacious man, holding a high position among the Platonists,--and I progressed, and made the greatest improvements daily. And the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings,(5) so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my stupidity, I expected forthwith to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato's philosophy.
CHAP. III.--JUSTIN NARRATES THE MANNER OF HIS CONVERSION.
"And while I was thus disposed, when I wished at one period to be filled with great quietness, and to shun the path of men, I used to go into a certain field not far from the sea. And when I was near that spot one day, which having reached I purposed to be by myself, a certain old man, by no means contemptible in appearance, exhibiting meek and venerable manners, followed me at a little distance. And when I turned round to him, having halted, I fixed my eyes rather keenly on him.
"And he said, 'Do you know me?'
"I replied in the negative.
"'Why, then,' said he to me, 'do you so look at me?'
"'I am astonished,' I said, 'because you have chanced to be in my company in the same place; for I had not expected to see any man here.'
"And he says to me, 'I am concerned about some of my household. These are gone away from me; and therefore have I come to make personal search for them, if, perhaps, they shall make their appearance somewhere. But why are you here?' said he to me.
"'I delight,' said I, 'in such walks, where my attention is not distracted, for converse with myself is uninterrupted; and such places are most fit for philology.'(6)
"'Are you, then, a philologian,'(7) said he,(4) but no lover of deeds or of truth? and do you not aim at being a practical man so much as being a sophist?'
"'What greater work,' said I, 'could one accomplish than this, to show the reason which governs all, and having laid hold of it, and being mounted upon it, to look down on the errors of others, and their pursuits? But without philosophy and right reason, prudence would not be present to any man. Wherefore it is necessary for every man to philosophize, and to esteem this the greatest and most honourable work; but other things only of second-rate or third-rate importance, though, indeed, if they be made to depend on philosophy, they are of moderate value, and worthy of acceptance; but deprived of it, and not accompanying it, they are vulgar and coarse to those who pursue them.'
"'Does philosophy, then, make happiness?' said he, interrupting.
"'Assuredly,' I said, 'and it alone.'
"'What, then, is philosophy?' he says; 'and what is happiness? Pray tell me, unless something hinders you from saying.'
"'Philosophy, then,' said I, 'is the knowledge of that which really exists, and a clear perception of the truth; and happiness is the reward of such knowledge and wisdom.'
"'But what do you call God?' said he.
"'That which always maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things--that, indeed, is God.' So I answered him; and he listened to me with pleasure, and thus again interrogated me:--
"'Is not knowledge a term common to different matters? For in arts of all kinds, he who knows any one of them is called a skilful man in the art of generalship, or of ruling, or of healing equally. But in divine and human affairs it is not so. Is there a knowledge which affords understanding of human and divine things, and then a thorough acquaintance with the divinity and the righteousness of them?'
"'Assuredly,' I replied.
"'What, then? Is it in the same way we know man and' God, as we know music, and arithmetic, and astronomy, or any other similar branch?'
"'By no means,' I replied.
"'You have not answered me correctly, then,' he said; 'for some [branches of knowledge] come to us by learning, or by some employment, while of others we have knowledge by sight. Now, if one were to tell you that there exists in India an animal with a nature unlike all others, but of such and such a kind, multiform and various, you would not know it before you saw it; but neither would you be competent to give any account of it, unless you should hear from one who had seen it.'
"'Certainly not,' I said.
"'How then,' he said, 'should the philosophers judge correctly about God, or speak any truth, when they have no knowledge of Him, having neither seen Him at any time, nor heard Him?'
"'But, father,' said I, 'the Deity cannot be seen merely by the eyes, as other living beings can, but is discernible to the mind alone, as Plato says; and I believe him.'
CHAP. IV.--THE SOUL OF ITSELF CANNOT SEE GOD.
"'Is there then,' says he, 'such and so great power in our mind? Or can a man not perceive by sense sooner? Will the mind of man see God at any time, if it is uninstructed by the Holy Spirit?'
"'Plato indeed says,' replied I, 'that the mind's eye is of such a nature, and has been given for this end, that we may see that very Being when the mind is pure itself, who is the cause of all discerned by the mind, having no colour, no form, no greatness--nothing, indeed, which the bodily eye looks upon; but It is something of this sort, he goes on to say, that is beyond all essence, unutterable and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good, coming suddenly into souls well-dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and desire of seeing Him.'
"'What affinity, then,' replied he, 'is there between us and God? Is the soul also divine and immortal, and a part of that very regal mind? And even as that sees God, so also is it attainable by us to conceive of the Deity in our mind, and thence to become happy?'
"'Assuredly,' I said.
"'And do all the souls of all living beings comprehend Him?' he asked; 'or are the souls of men of one kind and the souls of horses and of asses of another kind?'
"'No; but the souls which are in all are similar,' I answered.
"'Then,' says he, 'shall both horses and asses see, or have they seen at some time or other, God?'
"'No,' I said; 'for the majority of men will not, saving such as shall live justly, purified by righteousness, and by every other virtue.'
"'It is not, therefore,' said he, 'on account of his affinity, that a man sees God, nor because he has a mind, but because he is temperate and righteous?'
"'Yes,' said I; 'and because he has that whereby he perceives God.'
"'What then? Do goats or sheep injure any one?'
"'No one in any respect,' I said.
"'Therefore these animals will see [God] according to your account,' says he.
"'No; for their body being of such a nature, is an obstacle to them.'
"He rejoined,' If these animals could assume speech, be well assured that they would with greater reason ridicule our body; but let us now dismiss this subject, and let it be conceded to you as you say. Tell me, however, this: Does the soul see [God] so long as it is in the body, or after it has been removed from it?'
"'So long as it is in the form of a man, it is possible for it,' I continue, 'to attain to this by means of the mind; but especially when it has been set free from the body, and being apart by itself, it gets possession of that which it was wont continually and wholly to love.'
"'Does it remember this, then [the sight of God], when it is again in the man?'
"'It does not appear to me so,' I said.
"'What, then, is the advantage to those who have seen [God]? or what has he who has seen more than he who has not seen, unless he remember this fact, that he has seen?'
"'I cannot tell,' I answered.
"'And what do those suffer who are judged to be unworthy of this spectacle?' said he.
"'They are imprisoned in the bodies of certain wild beasts, and this is their punishment.'
"'Do they know, then, that it is for this reason they are in such forms, and that they have committed some sin?'
"'I do not think so.'
"'Then these reap no advantage from their punishment, as it seems: moreover, I would say that they are not punished unless they are conscious of the punishment.'
"'No indeed.'
"'Therefore souls neither see God nor trans-migrate into other bodies; for they would know that so they are punished, and they would be afraid to commit even the most trivial sin afterwards. But that they can perceive that God exists, and that righteousness and piety are honourable, I also quite agree with you,' said he.
"'You are right,' I replied.

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